By Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen
Statement is a primary characteristic of language. This quantity often is the position to appear for a person drawn to present paintings at the subject. Philosophers of language and epistemologists subscribe to forces to clarify what sort of speech act statement is, quite in mild of relativist perspectives of fact, and the way statement is ruled via epistemic norms.
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Additional info for Assertion: New Philosophical Essays
The impropriety of my assertion is explicable on the knowledge norm, since, in the described circumstances, it also seems intuitive that I do not know that my ticket has lost. 8) Williamson makes the further claims that the knowledge norm is constitutive of assertion and is not derived from any general rules governing conversation. As we will see later, these further claims do not affect the main purposes to which the knowledge norm for assertion has been put in epistemology. As a result, much of the epistemological literature discusses only the idea that knowledge is the norm for assertion and not the further claims that this norm is constitutive and non‐derivative.
Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— and Stanley, J. (2008). “Knowledge and Action,” Journal of Philosophy, 105: 571–90. Hill, C. , and Schechter, J. (2007). “Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief,”Philosophical Issues, 17: 102–22. Kvanvig, J. (2007). “Norms of Assertion,” Noûs, 41: 594–626. —— (2009). “Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries,” in D. Pritchard and P. Greenough (eds), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 140–60. Lackey, J. (2006).
He argues that a relativist about truth should instead endorse a relativistic version of the knowledge norm for assertion according to which an assertion of a sentence S by subject s in context of use c is correct, relative to the context of assessment a, if and only if “s knows that p” is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both c and a. However, he argues that, for Truth‐Relativism to be at all plausible, an alternative view of assertion needs to be ruled out. According to this alternative view, which he labels “Norm‐Relativism,” what norm of assertion is in play in some context of use is itself relative to a perspective.